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Investment consultants and academic researchers alike are interest-
ed in issues related to investment management and investment perfor-
mance. Accordingly, the aim of this paper is to review the existing
methods of investigating investment management and performance,
to comment on current trends and to extrapolate forward areas of
investigation which are likely to expand. The classic theories are well
known and covered in this paper for the sake of completeness, but the
focus of the paper is on developments in the recent decade, of which
there are many, and future areas which we consider to be likely areas
of investigation.
In this study, we look at the classic and historical theories andmajor
empirical studies of investment performance including the Capital Asset
Pricing Model (CAPM) of Sharpe (1964, 1967) and Jensen's (1968) and
multifactor models such as those of Fama and French (1992, 1993) and
Carhart (1997) (Section 1). While these models still play an active
part in current academic research, they have not met the requirements
of the investment industry so the need for investment benchmarks re-
mains in order to satisfy the continuing need to measure investment
performance.
It can be observed that the range of views on the efﬁcacy of such
models is wide indeed (Section 2). At one extreme, we have those
who broadly accept the assumptions and ﬁndings of classic models
such as Fama and French (1992, 1993) and use them as a jumping off
stage for extension. At the other extreme, we observe thosewho believe
that the biases and artiﬁcial constructs of these models have no role to
play in the assessment of management performance as they set out to
measure something neither investors nor investment managers attend
to in the business world. The reluctance of the investment industry to
accept the traditional factor models naturally leads us to enquire why
they have not been adopted andwhatwould amore acceptable alterna-
tive of measuring investment performance entail? We consider the
reﬁnements to these models and the reasons given why they have not
been adopted. This leads naturally towards reﬁnements in classic
benchmarks, where the models bear more resemblance to the bench-
mark for a style of investment or a category of funds that are actually
in use and reﬂects the constraints fundmanagers must operate within.3
Thesemodels often bearmore resemblance to the CAPM and the single-
factormodels, butwith a selected benchmark to represent the appropri-
ate investment universe thus aligning them more closely with invest-
ment practise where a combination of investment benchmark and
investment peer group form the basis of monitoring.4Such alignment
is not completely out of step with the multifactor models developed
by Fama and French (1993). Connor (1995), writing shortly after
Fama and French (1993) termed such models fundamental factor
models. Such models rely on empirical ﬁndings with respect to stock
characteristics such as size or book-to-market ratio. More recent studies
investigate whether such effects can be captured bymodels using a sin-
gle benchmark which more closely aligns itself with those funds it is
benchmarking.
If an appropriate benchmark can be identiﬁed, this leads to the
assessment of investment skill or manager value-added (Section 3). If
there is skill, what type of skill is there, how do we capture this, and3 We should highlight some of the desirable elements of a benchmark before entering
into in depth discussion of the strength or weakness of particular approaches. A bench-
mark should provide a ‘Naïve’ representation of the set of investment opportunities facing
investors. The index should be investible and cover the practical opportunities for an in-
vestment style. It should be ﬂoat-adjusted i.e. it should be based on the market
capitalisation of tradable shares. Perhapsmore importantly, openness, clarity and simplic-
ity arewelcomed as indexeswhich are transparent in theirmethodology can be replicated
by others. The most important area in which the multi-factor models have failed is in the
crucial area of ‘intuitivebelievability’ in otherwords a benchmark should bebased on rules
that are accepted by the investment community; mutual funds and their investors.
4 An appropriate benchmark will reﬂect the risk-reward parameters of the investable
universe by a fund or group of funds. A ‘Total Market’ benchmark is often not appropriate
because of the mandate of a fund and the restrictions within a fund prospectus.does it cover manager fees? Recently, however, investigations have
gone beyond this and now attempt to answer the question, if there is
excess performance, is this due to skill or luck? The greatest share of
the money invested in equity mutual funds is still invested in active
management. The U.S. mutual fund industry has assets of $15 trillion,
approximately 50% of total world mutual fund assets (Investment
Company Institute, 2014). U.S. Domestic Equity funds comprised 38%
of this $15 trillion. Despite the rapid growth of index funds and signiﬁ-
cant redemptions, actively managed funds still account for 82% of U.S.
equity funds. This suggests that a greater proportion of investors believe
that investmentmanagers have the skills to outpace themarket. Are the
majority of investors misinformed and approximately $2.4 trillion are
misallocated or might we be missing something? Do they havemotives
or incentives that we do not understand?We thus expect the search for
more appropriate benchmarks and improved identiﬁcation and assess-
ment of skill to continue to expand in the foreseeable future. If theories
and models of investment are not accepted or implemented by inves-
tors and the investment industry, it is difﬁcult to envisage what
economic impact new benchmarks and assessments of skill can have.
The increasing availability of qualitative data and the developments
in the ability to process this has allowed investment research to
incorporate research on managerial characteristics and incentives
(Section 4). This allows us to consider agency conﬂict within the fund
management industry and incentives that may inﬂuence the activities
of fund families and fund managers. This is an area of investment
research which can only increase as more data become available and
interest expands beyond the purely quantitative assessment of
investment.
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows: Section 1 covers
the classic and historical theories andmajor empirical studies, including
the standard multifactor models. Section 2 looks at evaluating
and adapting the classic models. Section 3 considers realism in
benchmarking and investment skill. Section 4 reviews the impact of
managerial characteristics and incentives. The ﬁnal section concludes
and contains our views on which areas of research seem destined to
grow as techniques improve and data becomes available.
2. Classic models
The traditional models which have dominated the study of invest-
ment management and investment performance are anchored in the
concepts of the Capital Asset Pricing Model of Sharpe (1964) and
Jensen (1968) where both authors focus on the performance of
mutual funds and the value added by managers to the performance of
a passive index representing an investible universe. Almost 50 years
later, the concepts introduced within these ground-breaking papers
are still the core means of investigating investment value added even
though the means of evaluation have been greatly extended. Ground-
breaking work was also introduced by King (1966) and Farrell (1974)
who established that stock price behaviour may be due to latent or
common factors. The next phase of major innovation came in the
1990s when Fama and French (1992, 1993) introduced a set of risk
factors which proxies the effects of the market, stock size, and stock
valuation on performance and Carhart (1997) extended the model by
the addition of stock price momentum.5 Thus, the bedrock of academic
investigation of investment performance was established via the CAPM
model and the three-factor (Fama& French, 1992, 1993) and four factor
Carhart (1997)models. Thesemodels are still widely used today in their
original form but have also been modiﬁed, with many variants now in
existence.
Driven by pension reform, the 1990s also saw the explosive growth
of the mutual fund sector and a search for an adequate means of5 It should be noted that the factors presented by Fama and French (1993) represented
styles and strategies of investment that had been known formany years (See for example
Graham, Dodd, and Cottle (1934) or Fisher (1958).)
7 Chan et al. (2009) warn about complacency about the interchangeable nature of the
proliferation of variants of value-growth and size benchmarks or attributes and also the
differences that can be produced by different processes. While superﬁcial consideration
may lead to an assumption that cross-sectional regression of benchmarks and time-
series benchmark models will generate very similar outcomes for abnormal returns that
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Titman (1992) and Goetzmann and Ibbotson (1994). Sharpe (1992)
also turned his attention again to investment performance and
established a returns-based model of style analysis (RBSA) based on
estimated exposure to a set of passive indexes. On the basis of this
work, Sharpe also collaborated with index providers to develop style
benchmarks reﬂecting differing investment universes while BARRA
was established based on the risk factors identiﬁed by Farquhar,
Rosenberg, and Rudd (1982).6 Another key development in the consid-
eration of investment performance and the factors affecting it is the
work of Ferson and associated authors who sought to incorporate
factors reﬂecting the economy and the stage of the economic cycle to
‘condition’ performance measurement; see Ferson and Schadt (1996).
The investigation of mutual fund style by Brown and Goetzmann
(1997) concludes that narrow categorisation of investment styles is
not capturing the diversity of investment approaches employed in the
market. Themarket for investment funds is a segmentedmarket, differ-
entiated by size and investment style. Daniel, Grinblatt, Titman, and
Wermers (1997) outline the problem that the classic factor models
typically used in performance studies may be unable to identify any
abnormal or value-added performance if a fund's style characteristics
differ markedly from its benchmark. They address some of these con-
cerns by constructing passive characteristics-based benchmarks
utilising size, price to book, and the lagged returns of actual portfolio
holdings. This is a key issue taken up in Section 3, where the appropriate
choice of investment benchmarks is considered in detail.
To sum up the classic investment models, they seek to establish a
benchmark to judge and classify investment performance as, good,
bad, or indifferent as a guide to investment selection. Despite their
limitations, these classic theories or models still play an important role
in academic research, in some cases, as a jumping-off point for further
extension, but in other cases, as a set of ill-judged constructs to be
disproved and dismissed.
The focus of this paper is, however, on the developmentswhich have
taken place in recent years and identiﬁcation of emerging trends in
research so we will move on while observing that reviews of the earlier
periods may be found in Cuthbertson, Nitzsche, and O'Sullivan (2010),
Mason (2013), or Ferson (2013).
3. Evaluating and adapting the classic models
This section considers the attempts to improve upon and extend the
classic models or to evaluate classic models and suggest alternative
approaches. As we will see, views on the usefulness of the traditional
factor models are extremely diverse. The analysis we note and the
ﬁndings of biases and shortcomings of the classic models of investment
performance sowed the seeds for the move towards improving
benchmarking via the move towards appropriate benchmarking in
investment performance evaluation that we cover later in this review.
Most of the literature focuses on extending the three-factor model
rather than reﬁning the Jensen (1968) CAPM model as multifactor
models are themselves an extension of the CAPM model. Typical of
the adaptions of the three- and four-factor models is the study by
Wagner and Winter (2013), who extend the Fama and French (1992)
and Carhart (1997) factor models by adding two new factors
representing liquidity and idiosyncratic risk to form a six-factor
model. Others have factored economic elements into their models
such as Stivers and Sun (2010), who utilise the classic four-factor
model in their study on the cross-sectional dispersion in stock returns
under varying economic conditions. They conclude that the value pre-
mium, Fama French's (HML), is countercyclical while the momentum
premium (MOM) is procyclical. This conclusion is consistent with prac-
titioner observations. Value stocks (HML) are often seen as defensive6 BARRA provides a suite of analytical tools for portfolio managers and is now part of
MSCI as MSCI BARRA. http://www.msci.com/products/portfolio_management_analytics/and are favoured in a downturn in the stock market as typically they
have a low price/book ratio and a high dividend yield while momen-
tum-driven stocks (MOM) tend to have high price/book ratios, low
dividend yields, and high growth rates.
Early market-timing models of Treynor and Mazuy (1966) and
Henriksson and Merton (1981) are often used in conjunction with
factor models to assess the performance of investment funds. These
market-timing models are updated by Elton, Gruber, and Blake
(2012). One of their insights is that earlier models merely assume that
market timing took place in a prescribed or formalised manner. Their
study, which incorporate monthly portfolio holdings and ‘bottom-up
beta’ calculations, highlights the fact that managers can adjust their
market exposure by increasing or decreasing their exposure to particu-
lar sectors or stocks with different market exposures such as high beta,
small caps, or technology stocks. Such insights reﬂect strategies
employed by mutual fund managers who have to be fully invested in
the segment of the market they specialise in but may choose to alter
their market risk via stock or sector selection.
Goetzmann, Ingersoll, Spiegel, and Welch (2007) turn their atten-
tion to the possible ‘gaming’ of a wide range of performance measures
including the Sharpe ratio (1967) and Jensen's (1968) alpha and pro-
pose what they term the Manipulation-Proof Performance Measure
(MPPM). They suggest that the MPPM can overcome the shortcomings
of a wide range of performance models where fund managers can radi-
cally alter the return distribution by using derivatives or dynamic trad-
ing strategies. Brown, Kang, In, and Lee (2010) develop the ‘Doubt Ratio’
(DR), a diagnostic statistic derived from the MPPM which indicates
whether the reported returns from funds are suspicious. The MPPM
and the DR appear more applicable to hedge funds because mutual
funds reporting requirements may prohibit what they call ‘informa-
tion-free investing’.
We now turn to studies evaluating the classic investment perfor-
mance models ﬁnding a catalogue of shortcomings or biases which
tend to suggest that the abstractions of those models need to be over-
come to have a meaningful impact on investment practice.
In a key study, Chan, Dimmock, and Lakonishok (2009) address the
salient issues affecting the benchmarking of investment managers'
performance. They conduct a detailed study of the main methods used
in academic studies and investment practice, including regression-
based benchmarks such as the Fama and French (1993) three-factor
model, and characteristics-based benchmarks such as the Russell
indices. They warn that it is important to identify a manager's style or
fund manager's investment beliefs i.e. where anomalies may lie in the
market orwhich stock characteristicsmay yield themost fruitful invest-
ments. Once this is established, they should select a benchmark which
represents as closely as possible the investment opportunity set of the
fund, thus mimicking the underlying strategy of the portfolio. This
allows greater conﬁdence in any assessment of skill. They note that
evenwhenmethodologies are based on the same premise, for example,
size and market to book, results can be surprisingly different. They ﬁnd
that characteristics-based benchmarks such as the Russell Indexes track
actual portfolios more closely than regression based models. Their key
ﬁnding is that investment performance is so sensitive to benchmarking
methodology that there is not only disagreement about the size of ab-
normal returns, there is also disagreement about sign in some cases.7
The ﬁndings of Chanet al. (2009) fuel the investigation into style-appro-
priate benchmarks and the endeavour to reﬂect a funds true investmentis not the case. In their sample of mutual funds for the period 1989–2001 they found that
the various different benchmarks they applied disagree on the sign (over or
underperformance) in approximately a quarter of cases!
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(see Section 3 Realism and Investment Skill).
Huij and Verbeek (2009) ﬁnd that the standard multifactor models
have biases which overstate/understate mutual fund performance as
the hypothetical stock portfolios do not incorporate transaction costs
and the impact of fund restrictions on trading. While the problem may
be insigniﬁcant for the CAPMmodel, the biases are economically signif-
icant for the multifactor models. Their results conﬁrm the existence of a
value premium (Fama & French, 1993 HML) and a momentum premi-
um (Carhart (1997) winner minus loser (WML)) but ﬁnd no evidence
of a small cap premium (Fama & French, 1993 SMB). They ﬁnd that
alphas for value funds have a systematic downward bias and those for
growth funds have a systematic upward bias. They conclude that invest-
ment performance evaluation would be best achieved through the
utilisation of factors based on fund returns rather than stock returns.
Ferson and Lin (2014) consider the issue of investor heterogeneity
and argue that traditional alphas are not a sufﬁciently good indicator
of whether a fund is an attractive investment or not and extend the
traditional multifactor models by incorporating an investor's utility
function. Their model sets boundaries for investor disagreement and
diversity, which are found to be both economically and statistically
signiﬁcant. One of the implicit assumptions of earlier models is that in-
vestors behave as if they are homogenous which given the many types
of agents operating in ﬁnancial markets is clearly a heroic assumption.
Bali, Brown, and Caglayan (2014) propose proxies for economic un-
certainty as newmeasures of macroeconomic risk. They ﬁnd that while
their uncertainty betas explain a signiﬁcant proportion of the cross-
sectional variation in hedge fund returns, they do not report economi-
cally signiﬁcant results for mutual funds. This reinforces the view that
it is important to consider the restrictions facing mutual funds as
emphasised by Cremers, Petajisto, and Zitzewitz (2012).
It should be noted that while knowledge of the traditional factor
models has been widely disseminated over the past decades, by and
large, they have not been adopted by the investment industry. In
contrast, the BARRA risk models have been commercialised and are
widely used in the investment industry. It is also pertinent that industry
benchmark providers have all moved from the simple sorts implied by
the traditional factor models to more advanced methods of assessing
growth-value orientation. Over the last decade, all of the major index
providers, Standard & Poor's/Citigroup, Russell, MSCI and Dow Jones
Wilshire,8 have realised that simple rankings by a single valuation mul-
tiple such as Price to Book or Price to Earnings does not adequately
reﬂect investment styles or provide an adequate means of providing
benchmarking for investors that have a deﬁned investment style.
Thus, in addition to providing an array of size breakpointswhich include
large-cap, mid-cap, and small cap, they also provide more focussed
indices. They have all moved towards methods of index calculation
which reﬂect the growth–value orientation of the underlying shares.
A late entrant to the improvement of Fama and French (1993) comes
from Fama and French (2015) who move from a size- and valuation-
based model to four- and ﬁve-factor models which improve upon
their classic three-factormodel. The new factors are a proﬁtability factor
(Robust minus Weak RMW) and an investment factor (Conservative
minus Aggressive CMA). RMW is based on operating proﬁt and is
deﬁned as the difference between returns on portfolios with robust
and weak proﬁtability. CMA is the difference between the returns of
low investment ﬁrms (conservative) and high investment ﬁrms
(aggressive) based on the growth rate of total assets. The proﬁtability
factor may be regarded as a growth factor, whereas their traditional
Book to Market factor is a valuation measure. Their results show that a
four-factor model comprising market returns, size, proﬁtability, and
investment captures all ormore than a ﬁve-factormodelwhich includes8 There have also been realignments and mergers within the index providers, thus S&P
and Citigroup are now combined, Barra has been incorporated into MSCI and Dow Jones
and Wilshire are also now a single entity.valuation. They also compare both models with their traditional three-
factor model updated with 21 years of extra data. Their study period
runs from July 1963 to December 2013. Having tested the various
models over this prolonged period, they suggest that the valuation
factor (HML)9 is redundant because the effect of that factor is fully
captured by the other factors, particularly proﬁtability and investment.
They do, however, include it in the ﬁve-factormodel to facilitate capture
of the ‘value premium’.
While these studies are prominent, they are only the tip of the
iceberg when we consider the suitability of a benchmark as a yardstick
for investment. This leads us to the ongoing development of realism in
benchmarking and more advanced methods to probe whether invest-
ment skill truly exists. Beforemoving on,we should reﬂect on the obser-
vation of Chan et al. (2009) that a model which does not mimic a fund's
investment universe is of little value as an indicator of skill.
4. Realism and investment skill
The increasing trend towards realistic assessment of the constraints
facing investment managers and the drive for appropriate benchmarks
are two important themes in recent years which are set to continue in
future research. The themeof appropriatemeasures of skill is also devel-
oped further in a series of papers, including Kosowski, Timmermann,
Wermers, and White (2006) and Fama and French (2010). They raise
the question that if abnormal returns or alpha exists, is this due to
luck or skill? This drive towards better identiﬁcation of skill also
seems likely to continue to be a key element of future research on
investment outcomes and appraisal.
The acknowledgement of market segmentation is a key develop-
ment in the analysis of investment performance and investment
ﬂows. Typically, the markets are segmented by size and investment
style. Size is the market capitalisation of the stocks invested in by a
fund while style is slightly more complex. Style reﬂects a fund or fund
manager's investment philosophy or investment beliefs, i.e., where
anomalies lie in the market or which stock characteristics may yield
themost fruitful investments. The investment process thenﬁlters stocks
to reﬂect these characteristics and a portfolio is generated with biases
which reﬂect these characteristics. This iswidely accepted in a segment-
edmarket such as the U.S. equitymarket where peer groups are formed
on this basis for comparison, and appropriate benchmarks are selected
which reﬂect the different investible universes of such funds.
Wahal and Yavuz (2013) highlight the fact that while style investing
is ubiquitous among investors, from retail to institutional investors, in-
vestment consultants and pension plan sponsors, it has attracted little
attention in academia. A few exceptions, including Barberis and
Shleifer (2003), focus on this important area introducing the concept
of differentiated groups of funds offering fundamentally different sets
of risk return opportunities into the assessment of investment perfor-
mance and skill. They outline conditions that must be met for a style
classiﬁcation scheme. Styles must be widely followed by investors. In
total, theymust span their asset class andmembershipmust bemutual-
ly exclusive. Their results suggest that style investment, and it's genera-
tion of co-movement among similar stocks, plays a signiﬁcant role in the
predictability of asset returns.
The themeof investor differentiation and its impact on investment is
developed by Menzly and Ozbas (2010). They highlight the nature of
market segmentation and information ﬂows, relaxing the assumptions
of the efﬁcient market hypothesis and introducing a degree of friction
into asset price adjustments by highlighting the delayed price response
to shocks in related ﬁrms. They assert that investor specialisation has a
signiﬁcant effect on price formation as this specialisation results in in-
formational segmentation of markets and is consistent with the trading
behaviour of informed investors. Schultz (2010), following Grossman9 HML is High Book tomarketMinus Lowbook tomarket returns. This is said to capture
the ‘value’ premium.
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inefﬁcient enough to reward analysts or investors for the cost of their
analysis. Collecting information, arbitrage and trading are both costly
and risky, thereforemarketsmight be competitive but still information-
ally inefﬁcient. Given the different levels of difﬁculty in analysing
(or trading) in differing areas of themarket, it is logical that the rewards
to research and analysis are higher in areas where more time or skill is
required. For example, they ﬁnd that abnormal returns of small growth
stocks held by mutual funds were considerably higher than large-cap
value stocks, and this was justiﬁed by both complexity of analysis and
risk.
It seems that the requirements of practitioners and academic studies
are becoming more closely aligned as one of the fundamental require-
ments of a good benchmark is that it should be investible and should
reﬂect the universe of opportunities, with attendant risks, within the
constraints imposed on the manager. Kothari and Warner (2001),
Cremers et al. (2012), and Angelidis, Giamouridis, and Tessaromatis
(2013) all argue that if a benchmark does not reﬂect the investment
style characteristics of the fund being evaluated, it will be unable to
determine whether a fund generates any abnormal returns or superior
performance. Equity investment styles may be considered as groups of
investorswho share some commonbeliefs,whose portfolios share com-
mon characteristics, and whose investment portfolios behave similarly
under varying conditions. The determination of investment style is a
multi-dimensional issue reﬂecting different combinations of revealed
preference for income, growth, and asset backing, as a form of product
differentiation. They all indicate that standard multifactor models fail
in this respect as they do not reﬂect the characteristics and objectives
of the funds under review. Huij and Verbeek (2009) suggests that in
addition to themarket factor, fundswould need to invest in hedge port-
folios which account for the risks in small, growth, andmomentum fac-
tors if they are to be evaluated against amultifactor benchmark, but due
to trading restrictions and very high costs, this is not possible.10 Further
concern is raisedwhen Chan et al. (2009) noted that differentmodels or
benchmarks could evaluate investment performance not only with dif-
ferent values but in some cases with different signs, thus underlining
the importance of using an appropriate benchmark. Sensoy (2009)
and Goetzmann et al. (2007) argue that benchmarks used by funds
should not be subject to gaming and should be well grounded in
economic theory. Sensoy (2009) links mismatched self-designated
benchmarks, on a growth–value dimension, with fund incentives to in-
crease fund ﬂows. Overuse of the S&P500 index by funds with a style
bias is highlighted.
Cremers et al. (2012) highlight the inherent biases of the Fama and
French (1993) and Carhart (1997) three-factor and four-factor models,
particularly the treatment of small cap stocks and the market factor.
They outline very clearly that a good benchmark should provide ‘the
most accurate estimate of a portfolio manager's added value relative
to a passive strategy’ and propose using stock market indices, which
are widely accepted and are tradable, as the factors in investment per-
formance evaluation. This follows on from their earlier paper, Cremers
and Petajisto (2009), which highlights the importance of identifying
the correct benchmark or index to analyse active managers. This is
important because using an inappropriate benchmark, which does not
reﬂect a manager's investible universe, leads to misinformation about
tracking error and obscures evaluation of performance using tools
such as the information ratio.1110 Mutual funds are not benchmarked against multi-factor models; in practise they are
benchmarked against stock market indices and peer group rankings.
11 Chan et al. (2009) deﬁne tracking error (tracking error volatility) as the annualised
standard deviation of excess returns i.e. the standard deviation of the difference between
a fund (or index) return and its benchmark on a periodic basis generally monthly or quar-
terly. Two conditions necessary for the calculation of tracking error are that the bench-
mark is a good ﬁt for the portfolio being assessed and that the benchmark has a beta of
1. The information ratio measures the amount of excess return per unit of tracking error
(active risk).Angelidis et al. (2013) share some ﬁndings with Elton et al. (2012)
but have arrived at them from a returns-based perspective rather than
an asset holding-based perspective. Angelidis et al. (2013) conclude
that it is appropriate to use managers' designated benchmarks rather
than the traditional factor models to evaluate investment performance
as fund behaviour is determined by the prospectus benchmark which
they are in practice evaluated against. The use of inappropriate bench-
marks is policed in practice by investment consultants and organisa-
tions such as Morningstar and Lipper whose business is to disseminate
information on investment funds to their clients.12 Like Elton et al.
(2012), they ﬁnd evidence of dynamic factor timing as funds adjust
their exposure to size, value–growth, or momentum factors. They
observe that traditionalmodels underestimate skill although on average
managers do not add value, with stock selection being the biggest cul-
prit causing underperformance.
The concept of active peer benchmarks (APB) which augment the
traditional multifactor models is introduced by Hunter, Kandel,
Kandel, and Wermers (2014) to evaluate mutual fund performance.
They have the advantage of being more closely aligned with investor
and industry practice. They observe that Morningstar and Lipper
produce similar peer groups but without a formal model.13 The refer-
ence group for each investment style is thus an equally weighted
group of funds following the same strategy, for example, their best-ﬁt
index is the same.14 One of the advantages of this methodology is that
it captures any commonalities in changing bets over time. The authors
claim that skill does exist for some funds and the APB benchmark great-
ly aids the identiﬁcation of skilled funds.
4.1. Segmentation
In a paper, which straddles several of our emerging themes, realism,
skill, managerial characteristics, and incentives, Guercio and Reuter
(2014) address the question; if active funds underperform the market
why is the majority of money invested in actively managed funds?
They conclude that the market for funds is segmented and the method
by which mutual fund shares are acquired, via a broker or directly
from a fund manager, play a signiﬁcant role in the nature of the funds
they invest in. Informed or experienced investors tend to invest and
dis-invest directly and this incentivises funds to strive to generate
alpha while ‘disadvantaged’ investors (Gruber, 1996) are either unin-
formed about performance or have difﬁculties processing and acting
upon this information thus providing fundswith less incentive to gener-
ate alpha.
While investment fees have attracted much attention in the litera-
ture, with frequent comparisons of gross and net alpha, the impact of
taxation on investors and the mutual funds they invest in attracts little
attention until recently. Sialm and Starks (2012), however, examine
the role of tax exempt deﬁned contribution (DC) schemes on mutual
funds. They ﬁnd that pension plan sponsors and pension planmembers
prefer certain characteristics, namely, larger fund families, higher assets
under management, and lower expense ratios. Thus, a higher propor-
tion of DC assets are found in funds possessing those characteristics.
Such funds tend to be less tax-efﬁcient in their trading and their realisa-
tion of capital gains than funds with a low proportion of DC assets. The
authors ﬁnd, however, that tax-efﬁcient funds do not have any lower
risk-adjusted returns than their high proportion DC equivalents.
The recent availability of fund speciﬁc data has led to further analysis
of the determinants of the ﬂow of funds into and out of mutual funds.12 Where managers have a clearly deﬁned investment, Morningstar, Lipper and invest-
ment consultants will compare them to a style appropriate investment benchmark and
an appropriate peer group. Specialised funds also tend to compare themselves to a style
consistent benchmark but their marketing also tends to compare their performance to
the S&P Composite Index.
13 They may wish to disagree with this view expressed by Hunter et al. (2014).
14 A best-ﬁt index would be one of a range of indices which when regressed against the
returns of a fund had the greatest explanatory power.
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Green (2004), where they develop a ‘rational’ model embracing past
performance and fund ﬂows. They claim their model establishes a
relationship between fund ﬂows and performance, which is consistent
with high average levels of skill but with a great deal of heterogeneity
between managers. This heterogeneity suggests that it is worth pursu-
ing the goal of identifying value-added investment skill. Berk and
Green (2004) conclude that managerial skill is a scare resource which
dissipates as scale increases. This is consistent with the investment
consultants questions noted elsewhere: is performance explainable, re-
peatable, and scalable? Berk and Green's (2004) equilibrium arguments
arewidely accepted as they provide theoretical and empirical argument
which intuitively explained why investment persistence tails off as a
consequence of heavy ﬂows of funds in the wake of superior perfor-
mance. Glode's (2011) model builds on the ﬁndings of Berk and Green
(2004) but develops the idea that where active returns vary with the
state of the economy, the decision to invest in an actively managed
fund is not irrational because a performance measure that does not
perfectly specify the pricing kernel of mutual funds will understate the
value-added of active management.
Sialm, Starks, and Zhang (2015) shed more insight into the ﬂows of
funds through investigatingDC Pension funds relative to non-DC related
funds holders. A signiﬁcant proportion of mutual funds are held via DC
pension plans, where plan sponsors provide a menu of fund choices
for participants of their schemes.15 They observe that DC sponsor
ﬂows react more to fund performance by adding or removing funds
from their menu of offerings in response to fund returns than non-DC
holders. The plan sponsors rather than scheme participants effectively
determine ﬂows as they move all holdings out of a fund, for example,
when they remove it from their menu. This tendency is increasing
over time. They suggest regulatory changes, and pressure from
employees, including those bringing lawsuits, and public opinion may
be behind this trend as plan sponsors are under pressure to perform
their ﬁduciary duties. They comment on the effects of this switching
and while it may not predict ‘winner’ funds, it at least avoids prolonged
exposure to the worst performing funds. They conclude that in the long
term, such performance chasing behaviour does not harm participants'
long-term pension performance prospects.
We can see from the above research that themove towards embrac-
ing more specialised factors is widely accepted with authors utilising
benchmarks which more accurately reﬂect the investment universe
and investment constraints of funds under review. We believe this
trend is set to continue and themore realistic or constrained the bench-
mark that is used, themore useful any pronouncement of manager skill
will be. Evaluating funds against the expectations of their investors
should be of more economic beneﬁt to those investors than using
benchmarks which are neither used by investment funds or their
clients.
4.2. Skill
There is much debate over whether active equity investment
managers possess skill in the aggregate, although the consensus is that
they do not (See Fama and French, 2010, for example). There are, how-
ever, mixed messages about whether some managers possess skill or
whether skill is found under certain circumstances. By skill. we mean
do managers make a value-added contribution to fund performance in
a way that cannot be explained by chance. In the best-performing
funds, we ﬁnd value-added or value-creating properties, while in the
worst cases, we ﬁnd value-destroying contributions. Carhart (1997)
found little evidence of skill (value-added) and his ﬁndings were
echoed by others. Berk and Tonks (2007) found that persistence tends
to be found among the worst-performing funds (value-destroying).15 DC Funds hold 27% of U.S. Equity funds assets. Based on Investment Company Institute
(2014) ﬁgures.This ﬁnding was in line with earlier studies such as Goetzmann and
Ibbotson (1994), who found persistence among the worst performers,
although like Fama and French (2010), they also found evidence of
persistent superior performance by the very best funds. Chen,
Jegadeesh, and Wermers (2000) and Kosowski et al. (2006) ﬁnd evi-
dence of superior performance among growth-oriented funds. In addi-
tion to the question, do funds possess skill in general, the question is
also raised, do funds possess certain types of skill. Baker, Litov,
Wachter, and Wurgler (2010) provide evidence of stock-picking skill
around earnings announcement time which complements earlier
work by Chen et al. (2000) and others who provide some evidence of
stock-picking skill, although this skill is neutralised by trading costs
and fees. Baker et al. (2010)ﬁnd that stocks bought prior to earnings an-
nouncements outperform those sold bymutual fundmanagers and con-
clude that this is in part due to their ability to forecast earnings-related
fundamentals.
Kacperczyk, Nieuwerburgh, and Veldkamp (2014) make a signiﬁ-
cant contribution to the assessment of investment skill in their study
of time-varying fundmanager skill. They conclude that skilled (success-
ful) managers pick stocks well in booms and time the market well in
recessions and deploy their skills differently over the course of a busi-
ness cycle. This corresponds closely to a practitioner's view of a skilled
manager as one who can make abnormal returns in the good times
but hold onto them in the bad times. They go further and state that
stock picking and market timing are tasks which skilled managers can
perform effectively rather than innate talents and add considerably to
the insights into how managers add value for their clients. They stress
the importance of ﬁnding the sub-set of managers that possess these
qualities. Their work builds on the contributions of Grinblatt and
Titman (1993) and Daniel et al. (1997), rather than the conditional per-
formance work of Ferson and Schadt (1996) and others, in that skill is
deﬁned as the cognitive ability to process public or private information
to generate superior risk-adjusted returns. This brings us to thequestion
whether observable skill is due to luck or the cognitive abilities noted by
Kacperczyk et al. (2014).
4.3. Skill or luck?
In recent years, the debate has extended beyond consideration of
whether funds possess skill, i.e., the ability to generate alpha a la
Jensen (1968), but whether this perceived value-creating ability is due
to skill or luck. This is because alpha estimates capture both skill and
luck. Pioneering work in this area has been undertaken by Kosowski
et al. (2006) and Barras, Scaillet, and Wermers (2010), who highlight
the need for benchmarks which reﬂect what Aragon and Ferson
(2006) call ‘otherwise equivalent benchmarks’, an opportunity set
which is equivalent to those facing the varying types of mutual funds.
Kosowski et al. (2006) starts a strand of research in the luck vs. skill
debate which is taken up by Fama and French (2010), Busse, Goyal, and
Wahal (2010), and others. They apply bootstrapping techniques to
evaluate if abnormal returns are the result of manager's skill or luck.
They ﬁnd that a ‘sizeable minority’ of funds create added value net of
costs and the superior alphas of these funds persist. They also ﬁnd, at
the bottom end of the spectrum, funds that destroy value. Their study
of the US mutual fund market incorporates bootstrap techniques
which control for the heterogeneous risk taking among funds, the
expected idiosyncratic variation in fund returns and the non-normal
distribution of individual funds' alphas.
Fama and French (2010) reﬁne the bootstrap techniques of
Kosowski et al. (2006) in a study of US mutual funds. They essentially
subtract a fund's estimated alpha from its return series, creating a set
of returns for which the true alpha is zero for each fund. Simulated
samples are then drawn from these zero-alpha fund return series. The
distribution of the alphas calculated from these simulated returns is
then compared to the distribution of the estimated actual alphas
allowing them to ‘infer’ whether funds possess true skill. On average,
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benchmarks; CAPM, three-factor, and four-factor benchmarks by
approximately the amount extracted for fees. Their assessment of
gross and net true alpha suggests that while there are abnormal returns
in the tails of their distribution, when compared to Kosowski et al.
(2006), they ﬁnd less evidence of skill. They discount their more signif-
icant ﬁndings for funds compared to the CAPM model on the grounds
that these are generated by the factors incorporated into the three-
factor model.
Busse et al. (2010) apply the Fama and French (2010) bootstrap
technique to institutional fund data and also ﬁnd that for the average
fund, there is no value-added performance contribution. They suggest
that relative to a three-factor benchmark, there is some evidence of per-
sistence of performance by some funds, but this is less evidentwhen the
momentum factor is added. Agyei-Ampomah, Clare, Mason, and
Stephen Thomas (2015) show that the use of standard multifactor
models underestimates managerial ability and overstates the propor-
tion of funds whose abnormal performance can be attributed to chance
rather than to skill, when compared with of style-consistent practition-
er benchmarks. They also ﬁnd that a single-factor performance evalua-
tion model that uses Russell style indices consistent with the style
orientation of a fund provides a parsimonious way of accounting for
fund performance. Also contributing to the luck versus skill debate is
Barras et al. (2010), who use a false discovery framework to estimate
the fraction of mutual funds that truly outperform their benchmark.
Skilled funds are those that add value (alpha) in excess of fees and
costs. They reach an interesting conclusion that the majority of actively
managed funds generate positive or zero-alpha, making them as good a
choice as passive funds, but there has been a signiﬁcant minority of
value-destroying funds that have nevertheless managed long-term
survival.
5. Managerial characteristics and incentives
In this section, we consider the managerial characteristics of fund
managers and fund groups that undertake portfolio management via
mutual funds. A function of portfolio delegation, managerial incentives,
determines managerial behaviour. There seems to be three broad areas
of research developing, which we feel are set to continue. The ﬁrst
theme is agency conﬂict, where tensions may exist between the man-
agers of the fund and members of the fund board and the interests of
investors. The second theme is the behaviour of fund families, i.e.,
those who own or control the funds. How they behave to their external
clients or meet their ﬁduciary duties and how they operate internally,
including allocation of their key asset, the fund manager. The third
theme is disclosure and informational efﬁciency. This may result in
segmentation of investors into informed and uninformed investors.
Early research into managerial aspects of mutual funds was under-
taken by Khorana (1996) who looked at the turnover of top manage-
ment at mutual funds and Avery and Chevalier (1999) who
considered the relationship between fund manager's behaviour and
fund performance. Khorana, Servaes, and Wedge (2007a) looked at
the impact of manager ownership of the funds they manage and
concluded thatmanagerial ownership creates a positive incentive align-
ment between mutual fund managers and mutual fund investors as
managerial ownership is correlated with improved performance.
5.1. Agency conﬂict
Several key papers have transported corporate governance themes
into the arena ofmutual fund research. Asmore qualitative data become
available for the mutual fund industry, this type of research is likely to
ﬂourish. One such study is undertaken by Kuhnen (2009), who explores
the agency conﬂicts between fund directors and fund management
advisors, who manage the funds. She evaluates the potential of agency
conﬂict and improved information ﬂow where board advisor ties arestrong. Her conclusion is, in the case of the US mutual fund industry,
the potential for harmful collusion is balanced by improvedmonitoring.
Extending this analysis of the role of board structure andmergers with-
in the mutual fund industry, Khorana, Tufano, andWedge (2007b) ﬁnd
that the power of independent directors plays a key role in whether a
fund merger takes place. The SEC requires that 75% of fund directors
are independent but where all fund directors are independent, they
believe that the conﬂict of interest between the well-compensated tar-
get board and the shareholders of the target fund are likely to be over-
come. Ferris and Yan (2007) disagree, however, as they ﬁnd neither
the probability of a fund scandal nor overall fund performance is related
to either chair or board independence and go on to question the beneﬁts
of the SEC's actions in terms of mutual fund corporate governance.
The role of agency conﬂict and disclosure is investigated by Edelen,
Evans, and Kadlec (2012) by considering transparency of payments for
services; whether they are expensed and therefore visible or whether
they are bundled with brokerage commissions and therefore opaque.
The implication is that the latter is deducted directly from fund NAV,
whereas the former is a cost to the fund manager or fund family. They
conclude that transparency is crucial in addressing agency costs of
fund management. Stoughton, Wu, and Zechner (2011) look at trans-
parency at the entry point of funds into mutual funds. They explore
the role of ﬁnancial advisors and other intermediaries who often sit be-
tween investors and funds, deriving themajority of their compensation
from ‘kickbacks’. This links in with Guercio and Reuter’s (2014) concept
of informed/experienced investors and uninformed investors who are
willing to pay such charges. Stoughton et al. (2011) conclude that the
more competitive the market space is for active investors, the more
impartial advice becomes. The theme of the ‘smart’ investor is also
taken up by Korniotis and Kumar (2013) using a proxy for smartness
(informed investors) based on demographic factors. They conclude
that smart investors have informational advantageswhile psychological
biases drive the portfolio decisions of ‘dumb’ investors.While this paper
focuses on stocks, it is consistentwith theﬁndings of Guercio andReuter
(2014) and possibly even Stoughton et al. (2011) for funds.
5.2. Fund families
Berzins, Liu, and Trzcinka (2013) look at the corporate structure of
fund families and offer evidence that conﬂicts of interest, withmeaning-
ful economic consequences, can be found where asset management
businesses are owned by investment banks. This agency conﬂict is
highlighted by comparing the effects of bank and non-bank ownership.
Chen, Goldstein, and Jiang (2008) ﬁnd that directors' ownership of
mutual funds is more widespread than anticipated and has a beneﬁcial
effect on directors' monitoring of funds. They conclude that ownership
patterns are consistent with an optimal contracting equilibrium,
which adds another dimension to the agency conﬂict debate. Ferris
and Yan (2007) considers ﬂow of funds and agency problems ﬁnding
that public fund families are more adept at raising funds than private
fund families. However, other things being equal, public fund families
underperform funds managed by private fund families. They conclude
that because of the short-term focus of public fund management
companies, the agency problem between management and share-
holders is greater.
Several studies look at the way fund families treat their ‘star’ man-
agers. Nohel,Wang, and Zheng (2010) found thatwhere ‘star’managers
were allowed to run hedge funds alongside mutual funds, the mutual
funds signiﬁcantly outperformed their peer groups. This practice
seems to be a means of retaining or hiring top talent. They conclude
that there is no loss of welfare for mutual fund investors. Fang, Kempf,
and Trapp (2014) also believe that fund families know the value of
their human capital and are aware of the relationship between skill
and performance. Consequently, they allocate skilled managers to less
efﬁcient markets or market segments where they can add more value
and outperform less skilled or experienced managers. The role of fund
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(2005), who investigate the relationship between fund families and
their appointed fund managers. Fund families may also engage in
strategic cross-subsidisation of funds, as highlighted by Gaspar, Massa,
and Matos (2006). Chen, Hong, Jiang, and Kubik (2013) consider the
role of outsourcing on mutual fund management. They observe that
when performance and incentives are considered, it is difﬁcult to gener-
ate abnormal returns from amanager running outsourced funds as they
lie beyond the boundaries of the ﬁrm due to higher powered
incentivisation and the heightened risk of withdrawal of funds. Typical-
ly, such managers underperform internal managers by a signiﬁcant
margin.
5.3. Incentives
Brown, Harlow, and Starks (1996) hypothesise that mutual fund
managers have an incentive to increase their risk levels in the second
half of the year if their ﬁrst-half peer group ranking is very poor. This
recognises the fact that while manager revenues are a function of assets
under management via their fees, mutual fund ﬂows are in part driven
by peer group and benchmark performance. Schwarz (2012) uncovers
new evidence of bias in sorting methods and after adjustment for
these biases ﬁnds results that are consistent with increasing risk-
taking tournament behaviour. This behaviour seems to be driven by
peer group ranking rather than ﬁrst-half market conditions as repre-
sented by ﬁrst-half median returns. Kempf and Ruenzi (2008) develop
the mutual funds tournaments literature when they consider the role
of tournaments within mutual fund families. It is well known anecdot-
ally that all funds and fund managers are not regarded as equal within
their fund families so there may be rivalry within ﬁrms which leads to
tournament like behaviour. Decision taking by individual managers
and the restraining elements of teams are considered by Bär, Kempf,
and Ruenzi (2011) utilising the diversiﬁcation of opinions and the
group shift decision making theories. They ﬁnd that teams have a
moderating inﬂuence on each other and consequently have less
extreme investment styles, less concentrated portfolios, and therefore
have less extreme performance outcomes.
The role of contractual incentives with respect to mutual funds dur-
ing the ‘dot-com boom’ was examined by Dass, Massa, and Patgiri
(2008). Their conclusion was that funds with high incentives have a
greater incentive not to herd and become overextended during bubbles.
This can also be linked to the concept of time-varying fundmanager skill
as outlined by Kacperczyk et al. (2014). In practice, there may be offset-
ting forces in operation; while incentives may leadmanagers to diverge
from the herd, the existence of tracking error constraints limits the
ability to do so. In order to achieve the desired aim, there must be
a favourable combination of both. The skilled manager must judge
how far to ride the boom into the bubble and when to lock in the
performance. This would be consistent with Kacperczyk et al.’s (2014)
skill.
Koijen (2014) produces a dynamic model which addresses two
fundamental questions: Do mutual fund managers possess skill and do
managerial incentives inﬂuence risk taking? Koijen's (2014) model is
applied to U.S. equity funds data and separates out managers' ability,
risk preferences, and managerial incentives. The structural model
embodied in the study aids fund selection via more precise estimates
of manager skill, expected return per unit of additional risk, and to
some degree, the time-varying beta due to variation in benchmark
exposure.
The ﬂow of funds into mutual fund categories has long been an
indicator, albeit a lagging indicator, of end-user sentiment towards
particular categories of funds or even into the equity market itself
(see Ben-Rephael, Kandel, and Wohl, 2012). Anecdotally, it often
seems that it is only possible to attract funds into a sector or style of
mutual funds once that style has outperformed for a while. Frazzini
and Lamont (2008) seem to share this viewwhen they considermutualfund ﬂows in a study titled ‘DumbMoney’. Solomon, Soltes, and Sosyura
(2014) conﬁrm this thesis and highlight the role of media coverage of
mutual funds. Fund holdings with high past returns attract extra
ﬂows, but only if these stocks were recently featured in the media.
There is a wealth of information held by commercial organisations
such asMorningstar and Lipper,whose raison d'etre is to collect anddis-
seminate information on mutual funds, fund families, fund characteris-
tics, and performance to their clients in addition to the data required by
government and quasi-government bodies. As new methods of
accessing and utilising these data become available, this area of research
seems likely to increase.6. Conclusion
When we consider the recent trends in the analysis of investment
management and investment performance, one of the ﬁrst things to
note are the high-quality papers which have led the topic, particularly
so in the newer developments and emerging trends in the area. Many
of the developments in this ﬁeld, going back to Fama and French
(1992, 1993) have an empirical bias. They search for factors which can
proxy securities markets and thus explain the nature and performance
of investment portfolios.Whenwe speak of realism,wemean substitut-
ing factors which proxy the investment universe and investment
constraints more closely than a prior set of factors which may not
have taken account of certain aspects of the nature of investment man-
agement. We should note that 23 years after their initial three-factor
model, Fama and French (2015) have introduced new factors to com-
plement and replace their earlier factors.
Our analysis of the recent literature of investment funds, investment
characteristics, and investment performance leads us to conclude that
the following themes are likely to drive future research: realism, skill,
and incentives. These themes encompass the improvements in
benchmarking which seem likely to continue to take account of the
actual nature of investingwith its attendant constraints. It is recognised
in the literature that increasing applicability in benchmarking improves
the assessment of performance. Whether this is due to skill or exoge-
nous factors is an area of debate that can only continue to thrive. The
divergence of investment behaviour suggested by investors who hold
trillions of dollars in actively invested mutual fund investments and
the passive allocations suggested by the traditional multifactor models
must continue to be explored. The recent literature highlights some of
the ﬂaws of traditional assessments of investment opportunities and
this is set to continue. Cremers et al. (2012)made a very signiﬁcant con-
tribution in this areawhere they observed that somebenchmark indices
had ‘alpha’, while Kosowski et al. (2006) spearheaded the new search to
differentiate between skill and luck. Additionally, Kacperczyk et al.
(2014) have opened up an important new area of research with their
concept of time-varying fund manager skill.
The recent strides in technology are allowing quantitative and qual-
itative data to be more accessible. These data can be used for corporate
governance purposes so the provision of these data will continue to fuel
the search for appropriate managerial incentives. The theme of incen-
tives is one area which has beneﬁted from increasing availability of
data allowing Guercio and Reuter (2014) to consider mutual funds' in-
centive to generate alpha or Koijen (2014) to consider ability, incen-
tives, and risk preferences. The strategies of fund families is now open
to appraisal, Gervais et al. (2005) or Fang et al. (2014), as is the role of
fund directors, Ferris and Yan (2007).
While the standard academic measures of assessment, CAPM, and
multifactor models, will continue to be incorporated in some future re-
searchwhere they can add value, it is widely recognised that the invest-
ment industry has grown exponentially since those pioneering papers
were written as have the means of analysing the investment industry.
It seems likely that innovative research will be focussed on the broad
areas of realism, skill, and incentives as outlined above.
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